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Abstract—This paper studies the tradeoff in privacy and
utility in a single-trial multi-terminal guessing (estimation)
framework using a system model that is inspired by index
coding. There are n independent discrete sources at a data
curator. There are m legitimate users and one adversary,
each with some side information about the sources. The data
curator broadcasts a distorted function of sources to legitimate
users, which is also overheard by the adversary. In terms
of utility, each legitimate user wishes to perfectly reconstruct
some of the unknown sources and attain a certain gain in
the estimation correctness for the remaining unknown sources.
In terms of privacy, the data curator wishes to minimize the
maximal leakage: the worst-case guessing gain of the adversary
in estimating any target function of its unknown sources after
receiving the broadcast data. Given the system settings, we
derive fundamental performance lower bounds on the maximal
leakage to the adversary, which are inspired by the notion of
confusion graph and performance bounds for the index coding
problem. We also detail a greedy privacy enhancing mechanism,
which is inspired by the agglomerative clustering algorithms in
the information bottleneck and privacy funnel problems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider an information-theoretic multi-
terminal guessing framework with side information. Our
model is inspired by that of the index coding problem
[1], [2], but with a significant twist to place emphasis on
privacy. Index coding is a communication problem where
a sender aims to efficiently broadcast to multiple users
through a noiseless channel. See [3] and references therein.
In particular, the security and privacy aspects of index coding
have been investigated in [4]–[10]. Instead of maximizing the
communication rate, in our framework the sender’s goal is to
balance the privacy and utility performance in the broadcast,
both measured based on the success rate of correctly estimat-
ing a certain parameter of interest about the sources through
a single guess. We consider multiple independent sources
available at a data curator and assume that there are multiple
legitimate users, as well as one adversary in the system.
Each party (a user or the adversary) knows some sources
a priori as side information. The data curator broadcasts
(discloses) a distorted function of the sources to the users,
which is also overheard by the adversary. Such framework
has applications in various real-world scenarios, such as field
data broadcasting from a paddock aggregator in the presence
of a malicious agent in precision agriculture.
For the adversary, we adopt the maximal leakage intro-
duced in [11] as the privacy metric. It measures the worst-
case information leakage in terms of the gain of the adversary
in maximum a posteriori estimation of any target function of
the unknown sources after and before observing the disclosed
data. For legitimate users, we define our utility metric such
that it also reflects the improvement in users’ guessing ability.
Quite often in practice different sources are of different levels
of priority to a user. We capture this by dividing the unknown
sources of each user into two subsets. Some essential source
are required to be perfectly reconstructed by the user. That
is, the correct guessing probability of such sources after
observing the disclosed data is non-negotiable and must be
1. The remaining sources are less critical, for which the
user requires the guessing gain about each such source to
be larger than a certain negotiable threshold. The privacy-
utility tradeoff is cast as a constrained optimization problem,
where the objective is to minimize the privacy leakage to the
adversary, conditioned that the requirements on the utility of
the unknown sources for the legitimate users are satisfied.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, we
derive two lower bounds on the privacy leakage given the
source distribution and utility constraints (cf. Theorems 1-
2) from different persepctives. These lower bounds serve
as converse results (fundamental performance limits) for the
privacy leakage. Second, we propose a greedy algorithm as
the privacy mechanism (cf. Algorithm 1) inspired by the
agglomerative clustering method used in the information bot-
tleneck and privacy funnel problems [12]–[14]. We leverage
the connection between our data disclosure problem and the
index coding problem when investigating both the converse
results and the greedy algorithm.
Notation: For non-negative integers a and b, [a] denotes the
set {1, 2, · · · , a} and [a : b] denotes the set {a, a+1, · · · , b}.
For a set S, |S| denotes its cardinality. For any discrete
random variable Z with probability distribution PZ , we
denote its alphabet by Z with realizations z ∈ Z . We denote
an estimator of Z by Zˆ , whose alphabet is also Z .
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Assume that a data curator observes n independent dis-
crete random sources X1, X2, . . . , Xn. We assume a general
distribution PXi for each source. Without loss of generality,
we assume every source has full support. For brevity, when
we say source i, we mean source Xi. For any S ⊆ [n], set
Sc = [n] \ S, XS = (Xi : i ∈ S), xS = (xi : i ∈ S),
and XS =
∏
i∈S Xi. The data curator broadcasts a distorted
version of X[n], denoted by Y , generated according to the
privacy mechanism PY |X[n] , to a number of legitimate users,
which is also overheard by an adversary.
We consider a guessing framework where both the legit-
imate users and the adversary attempt to estimate a certain
parameter V of interest about the sources in a single trial.
Both the privacy and utility are measured in terms of a
guessing gain r as defined below. Consider any party (a user
or the adversary) that wishes to guess V with the side in-
formation Z . Note that V ⊥⊥ Z due to source independence.
The party aims to maximize the correct guessing probability
of V upon observing Y (i.e., the party employs the maximum
a posteriori estimator). For each (y, z) ∈ Y × Z , we define
the ratio between such maximized guessing probability after
and before observing a y ∈ Y given z ∈ Z as
r(V → y |z)
.
=
max
PVˆ |Y =y,Z=z
E
[
P
Vˆ |Y=y,Z=z(V |y, z)
]
max
PVˆ |Z=z
E
[
P
Vˆ |Z=z(V |z)
] (1)
=
max
v
PV |Y,Z(v|y, z)
max
v
PV (v)
. (2)
Privacy Metric: We assume the adversary has side in-
formation XP for some P ⊆ [n], and is interested in a
(possibly randomized) discrete function U of the sources XQ
it does not know, where Q
.
= P c. Quite often in practice,
this function is chosen by the adversary and is unknown to
the data curator. Therefore, we consider a worst-case privacy
leakage measure, a conditional version of maximal leakage
(MaxL) from [11], as our privacy metric.
Definition 1 (Maximal Leakage, [11]): Given a finite
discrete joint distribution PX[n],Y , the maximal leakage from
XQ to Y given XP is defined as
Lmax(XQ→Y |XP )
.
= sup
U :U−XQ−(Y,XP )
L(U→Y |XP ), (3)
where
L(U → Y |XP )
.
= logEPY,XP
[
r(U → Y |XP )
]
. (4)
Remark 1: Note that the MaxL in Definition 1 assumes a
different Markov chain model from [11, Section III-E]: for
our problem, the Markov chain model studied in [11] always
reduces to U −X[n] − Y regardless of Q.
For the rest of the paper, we refer to Lmax(XQ → Y |XP )
as Lmax when there is no ambiguity. A computable expres-
sion of the MaxL in Definition 1 is presented as
Lmax = log
∑
y,xP
max
xQ
PY,XP |XQ(y, xP |xQ), (5)
which can be obtained following a similar approach to [11].
We omit the derivation details due to limited space.
Utility Constraints: There are m legitimate users. User
i ∈ [m] knows some sources XAi a priori as side information
for some Ai ⊆ [n], and is interested in all the remaining
sources XAc
i
, which are divided into two groups of different
levels of priority:
• Source XWi for some Wi ⊆ A
c
i are indispensable to
the user, and thus must be correctly guessed by user i
with probability of 1 (i.e., perfect decoding).
• The rest of the sources, XGi , where Gi
.
= Aci \ Wi,
are less essential yet still useful/interesting. Thus, user
i requires the guessing ability gain upon observing Y
to be larger than a certain threshold di.
These result in the following two kinds of utility constraints.
For any i ∈ [m], we have
H(XWi |Y,XAi) = 0, ∀i ∈ [m], (6)
D(XGi → Y |XAi) ≥ di, ∀i ∈ [m], (7)
where D(XGi → Y |XAi) is defined as
D(XGi → Y |XAi)
.
= EPY,XAi
[
log r(XGi →Y |XAi)
]
. (8)
Note that for constraint (7), each legitimate user i is
interested in obtaining the source XGi rather than a func-
tion/feature of XGi . We simplify the notation D(XGi →
Y |XAi) to Di when there is no ambiguity.
Remark 2: Note the subtle difference between Di and
L(XGi → Y |XAi) = logEPY,XAi
[
r(XGi → Y |XAi)
]
as in
(4). The latter is lower bounded by the former due to Jensen’s
inequality. From the data curator’s viewpoint, requesting
Di to be above a certain threshold is more stringent than
requesting L(XGi → Y |XAi) to be above that threshold. We
use Di rather than L(XGi → Y |XAi) as our utility measure
as it leads to a simple closed-form result characterizing Lmax
in terms of Di (cf. Lemma 2).
Remark 3: The two types of utility constraints in (6) and
(7) can be unified to be represented in terms of the same
function D: The perfect decoding constraint (6) is equivalent
to requiring that
D(XWi → Y |XAi) = EPY,XAi
[
log
1
max
xWi
PXWi (xWi )
]
= H∞(XWi), (9)
where H∞(XWi) denotes the min-entropy (i.e., Re´nyi en-
tropy of order ∞ [15]) of XWi . One can show that for any
i ∈ [m], Di ≤ H∞(XGi). Consequently, we always require
that 0 ≤ di ≤ H∞(XGi) for any i ∈ [m].
Privacy-Utility Tradeoff: We denote such system by the
5-tuple (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ), where A
.
= (Ai, i ∈ [m]),
W
.
= (Wi, i ∈ [m]), and d
.
= (di, i ∈ [m]). Note that Gi is
determined by Wi and Ai, and Q is determined by P .
To design the privacy mechanism PY |X[n] , we need to
consider the fundamental tradeoff between the privacy and
utility. Any data distortion that reduces the information
leakage to the adversary can decrease the utility obtained
by the users. Such tradeoff is formulated by the following
constrained optimization problem.
inf
PY |X[n]
∈
PY |X[n] (PX[n] ,A,W,d,P )
Lmax(XQ → Y |XP ), (10)
where PY |X[n](PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ) denotes the collection of
randomized mappings PY |X[n] that satisfy (6) and (7) for the
problem (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ).
Due to the non-convexity of (10), instead of providing
an explicit solution, we derive lower bounds on Lmax by
taking inspiration from index coding. These bounds serve
as fundamental performance limits that cannot be surpassed
by any mechanism because they are enforced by the system
(PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ). In Section IV, we design an achievable
mechanism based on the idea of agglomerative clustering.
III. LOWER BOUNDS ON THE PRIVACY LEAKAGE
We derive two information-theoretic lower bounds on the
privacy leakage. One is based on the utility constraint (6)
only, while the other is obtained based on both (6) and (7).
A. Lower Bound Based on the Confusion Graph
The utility constraint (6) indicates that for user i, any
different realizations xWi 6= x
′
Wi
∈ XWi must be distinguish-
able based on the released y ∈ Y , as well as the user’s side
information xAi ∈ XAi . To describe such distinguishability,
we recall the notion of confusion graph for index coding [16].
Definition 2 (Confusion graph [16]): Any two realizations
of the n sources x1[n], x
2
[n] ∈ X[n] are confusable if there exists
some user i ∈ [m] such that x1Wi 6= x
2
Wi
and x1Ai = x
2
Ai
. A
confusion graph Γ is an undirected uncapacitated graph with
|X[n]| vertices such that every vertex corresponds to a unique
realization x[n] ∈ X[n] and an edge connects two vertices if
and only if their corresponding realizations are confusable.
Therefore, to ensure (6), a group of realizations of X[n]
can be mapped to the same y with nonzero probability only
if they are pairwisely not confusable. More rigorously, for
any S ⊆ [n], define
Y(xS)
.
= {y ∈ Y : PY |XS (y |xS) > 0}, ∀xS ∈ XS ,
XS(y)
.
= {xS ∈ XS : PY |XS (y |xS) > 0}, ∀y ∈ Y.
Then, we have the following lemma. We omit the proof as
it can be simply done by contradiction.
Lemma 1: Given a PY |X[n] satisfying (6), for any two
confusable x1[n], x
2
[n] ∈ X[n], we have Y(x
1
[n])∩Y(x
2
[n]) = ∅.
Given a set S ⊆ [n] and a specific realization xS ∈ XS ,
we define Γ(xS) as the subgraph of Γ induced by all the
vertices x[n] such that x[n] = (xS , xSc) for some xSc ∈
XSc . Notice that for any x
1
S 6= x
2
S ∈ XS and x
1
Sc 6= x
2
Sc ∈
XSc , (x1S , x
1
Sc) and (x
1
S , x
2
Sc) are confusable if and only if
(x2S , x
1
Sc) and (x
2
S , x
2
Sc) are confusable. Hence, given S ⊆
[n], the subgraphs Γ(xS), xS ∈ XS are isomorphic to each
other, and thus we simply denote any such subgraph by Γ(S).
We present our main result of this subsection as follows.
Theorem 1: For the problem (10) with confusion graph Γ:
Lmax ≥ logω(Γ(P )), (11)
where ω(·) is the clique number (size of the largest clique)
of a graph.
Proof: Consider any xP ∈ XP . There exists some re-
alizations x1Q, x
2
Q, . . . , x
ω(Γ(xP ))
Q ∈ XQ whose corresponding
vertices in the subgraph Γ(xP ) form a clique, which indicates
that the realizations (xP , x
1
Q), (xP , x
2
Q), . . . , (xP , x
ω(Γ(xP ))
Q )
also form a clique in Γ. That is, the realizations
(xP , x
1
Q), . . . , (xP , x
ω(Γ(xP ))
Q ) are pairwisely confusable.
Then by Lemma 1, for any k 6= k′ ∈ [ω(Γ(xP ))], we have
Y((xP , x
k
Q)) ∩ Y((xP , x
k′
Q )) = ∅. (12)
Therefore, we have
∑
y
max
xQ
PY |X[n](y |xP , xQ)
≥
∑
k∈[ω(Γ(xP ))]
∑
y∈Y(xP ,xkQ)
max
xQ
PY |X[n](y |xP , xQ)
≥
∑
k∈[ω(Γ(xP ))]
∑
y∈Y(xP ,xkQ)
PY |X[n](y |xP , x
k
Q)
=
∑
k∈[ω(Γ(xP ))]
1 = ω(Γ(xP )) = ω(Γ(P )), (13)
where the first inequality follows from (12). Hence, we have
Lmax = log
∑
xP
PXP (xP )
∑
y∈Y
max
xQ
PY |X[n](y |xP , xQ)
≥ log
∑
xP
PXP (xP ) · ω(Γ(P )) = logω(Γ(P )),
where the first equality is due to source independence, and
the inequality follows from (13).
B. Lower Bound Based on Guessing Gain and Polymatroidal
Functions
We introduce a key lemma that serves as the baseline in
the lower bound to be developed in this subsection.
Lemma 2: For the problem (10), we have
Lmax ≥ max{I(XQ;Y |XP ), max
i∈[m]:Gi⊆Q
∆i}, (14)
where ∆i
.
= Di +H(XWi∩Q) + I(XAi∩Q;Y |XP ).
The proof is presented in Appendix A.
For a given system (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ), H(XWi∩Q) has
a fixed value and Di is lower bounded by di according to (7).
Hence, the only terms in (14) that still depend on PY |X[n] are
the mutual information I(XP ;Y |XQ) and I(XAi∩Q;Y |XP ).
We further bound these mutual information terms below.
We draw inspiration from the polymatroidal bound [17],
[18] for index coding. The bound is based on the polyma-
troidal axioms, which capture Shannon-type inequalities on
the entropy function and play a central role in computing
converse results in network information theory [19].
Lemma 3: Consider the system (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ). For
any disjoint V, Z ⊆ [n], we have
I(XV ;Y |XZ) = g(Z
c)− g(Zc ∩ V c), (15)
for some polymatroidal rank function g(S), S ⊆ [n] such that
for any i ∈ [n], W ⊆Wi, G ⊆W c ∩ Aci ,
H(XW ) = g(G ∪W )− g(G), (16)
and
g(∅) = 0, (17)
g(S′) ≥ g(S), if S ⊆ S′, (18)
g(S′) + g(S) ≥ g(S′ ∪ S) + g(S′ ∩ S). (19)
Proof: Define g(S)
.
= H(Y |XSc) − H(Y |X[n]), ∀S ⊆
[n]. We have I(XV ;Y |XZ) = g(Zc)−g(Zc∩V c). It remains
to show that this g(S) satisfies (16)-(19).
For (16), consider any i ∈ [n], W ⊆ Wi, G ⊆ W c ∩ Aci .
Set A = [n]\W \G, and one can verify that Ai ⊆ A. Hence,
H(XW ) = H(XW |XA)−H(XW |Y,XA) (20)
= H(Y |XA)−H(Y |XW , XA)
= g(W,G)− g(G),
where (20) is due to source independence, (6), and Ai ⊆ A.
For (17), we have g(∅) = H(Y |X[n])−H(Y |X[n]) = 0.
For (18), for any S ⊆ S′ ⊆ [n], S′c ⊆ Sc, and thus
g(S′) = H(Y |XS′c) ≥ H(Y |XSc) = g(S).
For (19), consider any S, S′ ⊆ [n]. Set Sc ∩ S′c = S0,
Sc \ S0 = S1, and S′c \ S0 = S2. We have
g(S′) + g(S)
= H(Y,XS0∪S2)+H(Y,XS0∪S1)−H(XS0∪S2)−H(XS0∪S1)
≥ H(Y,XS0)+H(Y,XS0∪S1∪S2)−H(XS0)−H(XS0∪S1∪S2)
= g(S ∪ S′) + g(S ∩ S′),
where the inequality follows from the submodularity of the
entropy function, as well as source independence.
The above bound can be solved using either linear pro-
gramming (LP) or Fourier-Motzkin elimination [20, Ap-
pendix D]. In the system (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ), for any dis-
joint V, Z ⊆ [n], let
Λ(V, Z)
.
= min
g satisfying (16)-(19)
{g(Zc)− g(Zc ∩ V c)}.
Combining Lemmas 2 and 3 gives the following result.
Theorem 2: For the problem (10), we have
Lmax ≥ max{Λ(Q,P ),
max
i∈[m]:Gi⊆Q
(
di +H(XWi∩Q) + Λ(Ai ∩Q,P )
)
}.
Remark 4: In the index coding problem, we usually assume
uniformly distributed independent sources and a deterministic
mapping PY |X[n] . In contrast, Theorems 1 and 2 generally
hold for any discrete independent source distribution and
make no assumption on the privacy mechanism.
In general, Theorems 1 and 2 can outperform each other.
IV. PRIVACY MECHANISM DESIGN
We develop a greedy algorithm to provide a solution for the
problem (10). The algorithm is based on the agglomerative
clustering method, which has been used in the information
bottleneck [12] and the privacy funnel problem [13].
Consider a given system (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ). To design
the privacy mechanism PY |X[n] , we start from the one-to-one
deterministic mapping with Y = X[n] and PY |X[n](y|x[n]) =
1 iff y = x[n]
1 and then iteratively merge some elements
of Y to make the privacy leakage smaller (in other words,
we “blur” the revealed information), while still ensuring the
utility for the users at an acceptable level, i.e., satisfying (6)
1Note that such one-to-one mapping allows every user to perfectly
reconstruct every source and thus satisfies (6) and (7) for sure. Nevertheless,
it also leads to the largest privacy leakage as the adversary can also perfectly
reconstruct XQ and subsequently any function U it is interested in.
and (7). In particular, to ensure (6), we again utilize the notion
of confusion graph [16] introduced in Section III-A.
Based on the merging idea discussed above, we propose
an agglomerative clustering algorithm in Algorithm 1. Let
Y y1,y2 be the resulting random variable from merging any
y1, y2 ∈ Y . Let Θ denote the collection of {y1, y2} such
that merging them does not violate (6) and (7) and strictly
reduces the privacy leakage to the adversary:
Θ
.
=
{
{y1, y2} ∈ Y × Y : y1 6= y2, any two
x[n], x
′
[n] ∈ X[n](y1) ∪ X[n](y2) are not confusable,
D(XGi → Y
y1,y2 |XAi ) ≥ di,∀i ∈ [m],
Lmax(XQ → Y
y1,y2 |XP ) < Lmax(XQ → Y |XP )
}
.
(21)
The algorithm terminates if Θ becomes an empty set.
Algorithm 1: Agglomerative clustering algorithm for
problem (10)
input : The system (PX[n] ,W,A,d, P ).
output: Privacy-preserving mechanism PY |X[n] .
1 Initialization: Y ← X[n], PY |X[n](y|x[n])← 1 iff y = x[n]
and obtain Θ based on Y by (21);
2 repeat
3 {y∗1 , y
∗
2} ← argmin{y1,y2}∈Θ Lmax(XQ → Y
y,y′ |XP );
4 Merge y∗1 and y
∗
2 into y¯: y¯ ← {y
∗
1 , y
∗
2};
5 Obtain the new Y by letting Y ← Y \ {y∗1 , y
∗
2} ∪ {y¯} and
PY |X[n](y¯|x[n])← PY |X[n](y
∗
1 |x[n]) + PY |X[n](y
∗
2 |x[n])
for any x[n] ∈ X[n] while keeping the rest of PY |X[n]
unchanged;
6 Obtain the new Θ by (21) based on updated Y ;
7 until Θ = ∅;
8 return PY |X[n] ;
Remark 5: To compute Algorithm 1 more efficiently, notice
that finding argmin{y1,y2}∈Θ Lmax(XQ → Y
y1,y2 |XP ) is
equivalent to finding argmax{y1,y2}∈Θ
(
2Lmax(XQ→Y |XP )−
2Lmax(XQ→Y
y1,y2 |XP )
)
in step 3, which can be computed as
2Lmax(XQ→Y |XP ) − 2Lmax(XQ→Y
y1,y2 |XP )
=
∑
xP
max
xQ
PXP (xP ) · PY |X[n](y1 |xP , xQ)
+
∑
xP
max
xQ
PXP (xP ) · PY |X[n](y2 |xP , xQ)
−
∑
xP
max
xQ
PXP (xP ) · PY |X[n](y¯ |xP , xQ)
=
∑
xP∈XP (y1)
PXP (xP ) · 1 +
∑
xP∈XP (y2)
PXP (xP ) · 1
−
∑
xP∈XP (y¯)
PXP (xP ) · 1
= PXP (XP (y1)) + PXP (XP (y2))− PXP (XP (y¯)).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
To evaluate the performance of our main results, we
randomly generate the system (PX[n] ,A,W,d, P ) by 500
times according to the following conditions:
• n = m = 5, Wi = {i} for any user i ∈ [5], and A is
generated based on a randomly chosen graph G from the
9608 nonisomorphic 5-vertex directed graphs [3] such
that Ai = {j ∈ [5] : (j, i) ∈ G}.
• For any i ∈ [5], Xi = {0, 1} and Xi ∼ Bern(pi), where
pi is uniformly randomly chosen from range (0, 1);
• For any i ∈ [5], di = d˜i · H∞(XGi), where d˜i is
uniformly randomly chosen from range (0, 1);
• P ⊆ [5] is randomly generated assuring that |P | ≤ 2.
For each system, we compute the lower bounds LThm.1max and
LThm.2max by Theorems 1 and 2, respectively. An interesting
observation is that we have LThm.2max > L
Thm.1
max for only 2
among the 500 tested systems, while LThm.1max > L
Thm.2
max for
all the 498 remaining systems.
We also compute the MaxL according to the privacy mech-
anism PY |X[n] given by Algorithm 1, denoted as L
Alg.1
max . Then
we compute the ratio R = LAlg.1max /max(L
Thm.1
max ,L
Thm.2
max ). A
lower ratio R (close to 1) means that our converse and achiev-
able results perform well and are quite close to the optimal
L∗max, while a higher ratio indicates bad performance. We
summarize the values of R from 500 tests in Table I, from
which we can see that the proposed techniques achieves a
satisfactory level of performance for the majority of tested
problems. Notably, we have LThm.1max = L
Alg.1
max and thusR = 1
for 162 among the 500 tests.
Table I
PERFORMANCE OF THE LOWER BOUNDS VERSUS ALGORITHM 1.
Ratio, R = 1 < 1.05 < 1.1 < 1.2 ≥ 1.2
Number of
Systems
162 401 429 460 40
Future directions include improving the privacy mecha-
nism and the converse results for the multi-terminal guessing
problem (10), as well as studying the multi-terminal privacy-
utility tradeoff using different privacy and utility measures.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Note that the right hand side of (5) is equal to the Sibson
mutual information of order∞ [21], IS∞, and hence we have
Lmax(XQ → Y |XP ) = I
S
∞(XQ;Y,XP )
≥ I(XQ;Y,XP ) = I(XQ;Y |XP ),
where the inequality follows from [22, Theorem 2], and the
last equality follows from source independence.
It remains to show Lmax ≥ ∆i for any user i ∈ [m] with
Gi ⊆ Q. For brevity, we drop the subscript i remembering
that W,A,G stand for Wi, Ai, Gi, respectively. Set
WP = P ∩W, WQ = Q ∩W,
AP = P ∩A, AQ = Q ∩ A.
Since G ⊆ Q, we have P ∩ G = ∅, Q ∩ G = G, and thus
P = WP ∪ AP , and Q = WQ ∪ AQ ∪G. We have
Lmax(XQ → Y |XP )
≥
∑
y,xP
PY,XP (y, xP ) logmax
xQ
PY,XP |XQ(y, xP |xQ)
PY,XP (y, xP )
(22)
=
∑
y,xP
PY,XP (y, xP )
log
(
max
xWQ ,xAQ
(
PY,XP |XWQ ,XAQ (y, xP |xWQ , xAQ)
PY,XP (y, xP )
·max
xG
PY,XP |XQ(y, xP |xQ)
PY,XP |XWQ ,XAQ (y, xP |xWQ , xAQ)
)
)
=
∑
y,xP
PY,XP (y, xP )
log
(
max
xWQ ,xAQ
(
PY,XP |XWQ ,XAQ (y, xP |xWQ , xAQ)
PY,XP (y, xP )
·max
xG
PY,XA|XG(y, xA|xG)
PY,XA(y, xA)
)
)
(23)
≥
∑
y,xP ,xAQ
PY,XP ,XAQ (y, xP , xAQ)
(
logmax
xWQ
PY,XP |XWQ ,XAQ (y, xP |xWQ , xAQ)
PY,XP (y, xP )
+ logmax
xG
PY,XA|XG(y, xA|xG)
PY,XA(y, xA)
)
(24)
= I(Y,XP ;XWQ , XAQ)
+
∑
y,xA
PY,XA(y, xA)logmax
xG
PY,XA|XG(y, xA|xG)
PY,XA(y, xA)
(25)
≥ I(Y,XP ;XWQ , XAQ) +Di (26)
= I(Y ;XAQ |XP ) +H(XWQ) +Di = ∆i, (27)
where
• (22) follows from Jensen’s inequality;
• (23) follows from that for any y ∈ Y , xW∪A ∈ XW∪A,
max
xG
PY,XP |XQ(y, xP |xQ)
PY,XP |XWQ ,XAQ (y, xP |xWQ , xAQ)
= max
xG
PY,XA∪G(y, xA∪G) ·PXW |Y,XA∪G(xW |y, xA∪G)
PXG(xG) ·PY,XA(y, xA) ·PXW |Y,XA(xW |y, xA)
(a)
= max
xG
PY,XA|XG(y, xA|xG)
PY,XA(y, xA)
,
where (a) follows from the Markov chain XW −
(Y,XA)−XG as a result of the utility constraint (6);
• (24) follows from replacing maximum over xAQ with
expectation over PXAQ |Y,XP , and Jensen’s inequality;
• (25) follows from the fact that XWQ is a deterministic
function of (Y,XP , XAQ) according to (6);
• (26) follows from that
∑
y,xA
PY,XA(y, xA) logmax
xG
PY,XA|XG(y, xA|xG)
PY,XA(y, xA)
≥
∑
y,xA
PY,XA(y, xA) log
max
xG
PY,XA,XG(y, xA, xG)
max
xG
PXG(xG) · PY,XA(y, xA)
= EPY,XAi
[
log r(XGi → Y |XAi)
]
= Di;
• (27) follows from source independence, as well as (6).
This concludes the proof.
REFERENCES
[1] Y. Birk and T. Kol, “Coding on demand by an informed source
(ISCOD) for efficient broadcast of different supplemental data to
caching clients,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 52, no. 6, pp. 2825–
2830, Jun. 2006.
[2] Z. Bar-Yossef, Y. Birk, T. Jayram, and T. Kol, “Index coding with side
information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 57, pp. 1479–1494, 2011.
[3] F. Arbabjolfaei and Y.-H. Kim, “Fundamentals of index coding,” Foun-
dations and Trends R© in Communications and Information Theory,
vol. 14, no. 3-4, pp. 163–346, 2018.
[4] S. H. Dau, V. Skachek, and Y. M. Chee, “On the security of index
coding with side information,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 58, no. 6,
pp. 3975–3988, 2012.
[5] L. Ong, B. N. Vellambi, P. L. Yeoh, J. Kliewer, and J. Yuan, “Secure
index coding: Existence and construction,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
on Information Theory (ISIT), Barcelona, Spain, 2016, pp. 2834–2838.
[6] M. M. Mojahedian, M. R. Aref, and A. Gohari, “Perfectly secure index
coding,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, vol. 63, no. 11, pp. 7382–7395, 2017.
[7] Y. Liu, Y.-H. Kim, B. Vellambi, and P. Sadeghi, “On the capacity
region for secure index coding,” in Proc. IEEE Information Theory
Workshop (ITW), Guanzhou, China, Nov. 2018. [Online]. Available:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.03615
[8] V. Narayanan, V. M. Prabhakaran, J. Ravi, V. K. Mishra, B. K. Dey,
and N. Karamchandani, “Private index coding,” in Proc. IEEE Int.
Symp. on Information Theory (ISIT), Vail, CO, 2018, pp. 596–600.
[9] Y. Liu, P. Sadeghi, N. Aboutorab, and A. Sharififar, “Secure in-
dex coding with security constraints on receivers,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:2001.07296, 2020.
[10] M. Karmoose, L. Song, M. Cardone, and C. Fragouli, “Privacy in index
coding: k-limited-access schemes,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2019.
[11] I. Issa, A. B. Wagner, and S. Kamath, “An operational approach to
information leakage,” IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory, 2019.
[12] N. Slonim and N. Tishby, “Agglomerative information bottleneck,” in
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS), 2000, pp.
617–623.
[13] A. Makhdoumi, S. Salamatian, N. Fawaz, and M. Me´dard, “From
the information bottleneck to the privacy funnel,” in Proc. IEEE
Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Hobart, Australia, Nov. 2014,
pp. 501–505.
[14] N. Ding and P. Sadeghi, “A submodularity-based clustering algorithm
for the information bottleneck and privacy funnel,” in Proc. IEEE
Information Theory Workshop (ITW), Visby, Sweden, Aug. 2019, pp.
1–5.
[15] A. Re´nyi, “On measures of information and entropy,” in Proceedings of
the 4th Berkeley symposium on mathematics, statistics and probability,
vol. 1, no. 547, 1961.
[16] N. Alon, E. Lubetzky, U. Stav, A. Weinstein, and A. Hassidim,
“Broadcasting with side information,” in 49th Annu. IEEE Symp. on
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), Oct. 2008, pp. 823–832.
[17] A. Blasiak, R. Kleinberg, and E. Lubetzky, “Lexicographic products
and the power of non-linear network coding,” in 52nd Annu. IEEE
Symp. on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), Oct. 2011, pp.
609–618.
[18] F. Arbabjolfaei, B. Bandemer, Y.-H. Kim, E. Sasoglu, and L. Wang,
“On the capacity region for index coding,” in Proc. IEEE Int. Symp.
on Information Theory (ISIT), 2013, pp. 962–966.
[19] R. W. Yeung, Information theory and network coding. Springer
Science & Business Media, 2008.
[20] A. El Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network Information Theory. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
[21] R. Sibson, “Information radius,” Zeitschrift fu¨r Wahrscheinlichkeitsthe-
orie und verwandte Gebiete, vol. 14, no. 2, pp. 149–160, 1969.
[22] S. Verdu´, “α-mutual information,” in Proc. Inf. Theory Appl. Workshop
(ITA), Feb. 2015, pp. 1–6.
